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The recent wave of mobilizations in the Arab world and across Western countries 
has generated much discussion on how digital media is connected to the diffusion 
of protests. We examine that connection using data from the surge of mobilizations 
that took place in Spain in May 2011. We study recruitment patterns in the Twitter 
network and find evidence of social influence and complex contagion. We identify 
the network position of early participants (i.e. the leaders of the recruitment 
process) and of the users who acted as seeds of message cascades (i.e. the 
spreaders of information). We find that early participants cannot be characterized 
by a typical topological position but spreaders tend to me more central to the 
network. These findings shed light on the connection between online networks, 
social contagion, and collective dynamics, and offer an empirical test to the 
recruitment mechanisms theorized in formal models of collective action.  
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he last few years have seen an eruption of political protests aided by internet 
technologies. The phrase “Twitter revolution” was coined in 2009 to refer to the 
mass mobilizations that took place in Moldova and, a few months later, in Iran, in both 
cases to protest against fraudulent elections. Since then, the number of events 
connecting social media with social unrest has multiplied, not only in the context of 
authoritarian regimes – exemplified by the recent wave of upsurges across the Arab 
world – but also in western liberal democracies, particularly in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis and changes to welfare policies. These protests respond to very different 
socio-economic circumstances and are driven by very different political agendas, but 
they all seem to share the same morphological feature: the use of social networking 
sites (SNSs) to help protesters self-organize and attain a critical mass of participants. 
There is, however, not much evidence on how exactly SNSs encourage recruitment. 
Empirical research on online activity around riots and protests is scarce, and the few 
studies that exist 1-4 show no clear patterns of protest growth. Related research has 
shown that information cascades in online networks occur only rarely 5-7, with the 
implication that even online it is difficult to reach and mobilize a high number of people. 
Revolutions, riots and mass mobilizations are also statistically unique and, as such, 
difficult to predict; but when they happen, they unleash potentially dramatic 
consequences. The relevant question, which we set to answer here, is not when these 
protests take place but whether and how SNSs contribute to trigger their explosion.  
 
Sociologists have long analyzed networks as the main recruitment channels through 
which social movements grow 8-9. Empirical research has shown that networks were 
crucial to the organization of collective action long before the internet could act as an 
organizing tool, with historical examples that include the insurgency in the Paris 
commune of 1871 10, the 60s civil right struggles in the U.S. 11, and the demonstrations 
that took place in East Germany prior to the fall of the Berlin wall 12-13. These studies 
provide evidence that recruits to a movement tend to be connected to others already 
involved and that networks open channels through which influence on behavior spreads, 
T
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but they are limited by the quality of the network data analyzed, particularly around time 
dynamics. Analytical models have tried to overcome these data limitations by recreating 
the formal features of interpersonal influence, and analyzing how they are related to 
diffusion 14-17 and, more particularly, to examples of social contagion like collective action 
or the growth of social movements 18-22. Four main findings arise from these models. 
First, the shape of the threshold distribution, i.e. the variance in the propensity to join 
intrinsic to people, determines the global reach of cascades. Second, individual 
thresholds interact with the size of local networks: two actors with the same propensity 
might be recruited at different times if one is connected to a larger number of people. 
Third, attaining a critical mass depends on being able to activate a sufficiently large 
number of low threshold actors that are also well connected in the overall network 
structure. And fourth, the exposure to multiple sources can be more important than 
multiple exposures: unlike epidemics, the social contagion of behavior often requires 
reinforcement from multiple people. Recent experiments have confirmed the relevance of 
complex contagions to explain behavior in online contexts 23, and large-scale analyses 
have validated its effects on information diffusion on Twitter 24. 
 
Models of collective action have identified important network mechanisms behind the 
decision to join a protest, but they suffer from lack of empirical calibration and external 
validity. Online networks, and the role that SNSs play in articulating the growth of 
protests, offer a great opportunity to explore recruitment mechanisms in an empirical 
setting. We analyze one such setting by studying the protests that took place in Spain in 
May 2011. The mobilization emerged as a reaction to the political response to the 
financial crisis and it organized around broad demands for new forms of democratic 
representation. The main target of the campaign was to organize a protest on May 15, 
which brought tens of thousands of people to the streets of 59 cities all over the country. 
After the march, hundreds of participants decided to camp in the city squares until May 
22, the date for local and regional elections; crowded demonstrations took place daily 
during that week. After the elections, the movement remained active but the protests 
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gradually lost strength and its media visibility waned (more background information in 
SI) 
 
We analyze Twitter activity around those protests for the period April 25 (20 days before 
the first mass mobilizations) to May 25 (10 days after the first mass mobilizations, and 3 
days after the elections). The dataset follows the posting behavior of 87,569 users and 
tracks a total of 581,750 protest messages (see Methods). We know, for each user, who 
they follow and who is following them. In addition to this asymmetric network, we also 
consider the symmetric version, which only retains reciprocated – and therefore stronger 
– connections. Previous research has suggested that Twitter is closer to a news media 
platform than to a social network 6. The symmetric network eliminates the relatively 
higher influence of hubs and retains only connections that reflect offline relationships or, 
at least, mutual acknowledgement. Contrasting recruitment patterns in both the 
asymmetric and symmetric networks allows us to test whether the dynamics of 
mobilization depend on weak, broadcasting links or on stronger connections, based on 
mutual recognition. Our analysis of recruitment is based on the assumption that users 
joined the movement the moment they started sending Tweets about it. We also assume 
that once they are activated, they remain so for the rest of the period we consider. 
  
Results 
By the end of our 30-day window, most users in the network had sent at least one 
message related to the protest, with only about 2% remaining silent (but still being 
exposed to movement information, Fig. 1).The most significant increase in activity takes 
place right after the initial protest (May 15), during the week leading to the elections of 
May 22. Up to that point, only about 10% of the users had sent at least a message 
related to the protests.  
 
Activation times tell us the exact moment when users start emitting messages, and allow 
us to distinguish between activists leading the protests and those who reacted in later 
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stages. We calculated, for each user, the proportion of neighbors being followed that had 
been active at the time of recruitment (ka / kin). This gives us a measure that 
approximates the threshold parameter used in formal models of social contagion, 
particularly those that incorporate networks 16-17,21. Activists with an intrinsic willingness 
to participate have a threshold ka / kin ≈ 0, whereas those who need a lot of pressure 
from their local networks before they decide to join are in the opposite extreme ka / kin ≈ 
1. Looking at the empirical distribution, most users in our case exhibit intermediate 
values (Fig.2A). Although the distribution is roughly uniform for almost the full threshold 
interval, there are two local maxima at 0 (users who act as the recruitment seeds) and 
0.5 (the conditional co-operators who join when half their neighbors did). The symmetric 
network has a significantly higher number of users with ka / kin = 0 because it eliminates 
the influence of hubs or broadcasters (i.e. users who do not reciprocate connections – 
about 7,000 in the overall network – but who contribute to activate low threshold 
participants, the ‘seeds’ in the symmetric network). The shape of the distribution 
changes before and after 15 May, the first big demonstration day (Fig. 2B). Most early 
participants – i.e. users who sent a message prior to the first mass mobilizations and to 
the news media coverage of the events – needed, on average, less local pressure to join, 
which is consistent with their role as leaders of the movement. Because most activity 
takes place after 15-M, the threshold distribution for the ten days that followed is not 
very different from the threshold distribution for the full period.  
 
The actual chronological time of activation changes across same-threshold actors (see 
SI, Fig. S2); this variance is predictable given that actors react to different local 
networks, both in size and composition, creating an interaction effect that has already 
been studied using simulations 16-17,21-22. The time it takes neighbors to join, however, 
also influences the activation of users. We measure the pace at which the number of 
active neighbors grows using the logarithmic derivative of activation times ∆ka/ka = 
(kat+1-kat) / kat+1 25. The rationale behind ∆ka/ka is that some users might be susceptible 
7 
 
to “recruitment bursts”, that is, more likely to join if many of their neighbors do in a 
short time-span. This emphasis on time dynamics qualifies the idea of complex 
contagion: receiving stimuli from multiple sources is important because, unlike 
epidemics, social contagion often requires exposure to a diversity of sources 21; evidence 
of “recruitment bursts” would suggest that the effects of multiple and diverse exposures 
are magnified if they take place in a short time window. We find that early participants, 
i.e. users with low thresholds, are insensitive to recruitment bursts; for the vast majority 
of users, however, being exposed to sudden rates of activation precedes their decision to 
join (Fig. 3A). Users with moderate thresholds who are susceptible to bursts act as the 
critical mass that makes the movement grow from a minority of early participants to the 
vast majority of users: without them, late participants (the majority of users that made 
the movement explode) would not have joined in (Fig. 3B).   
 
Information diffusion follows different dynamics. Very few messages generate cascades 
of a global scale: we assume that if a user emits a message at time t and one of their 
followers also emits a message within the interval (t, t+ ∆t), both messages belong to 
the same chain. A chain is aborted when none of the followers exposed to a message 
acts as a spreader, and messages can only belong to a single chain, i.e. only the 
messages that do not belong to a previous chain are considered seeds for a new cascade 
(see Methods). The vast majority of these chains die soon, with only a very small 
fraction reaching global dimensions, a result that is robust using different time intervals 
(Fig. 4A). This supports previous findings 5-7 and reveals that cascades are rare even in 
the context of exceptional events. We run a k-shell decomposition analysis 26 to identify 
the network position of users acting as seeds of the most successful chains. We found a 
positive association between network centrality, as measured by the classification of 
nodes in high k-cores, and cascade size (Fig. 4B). This positive association suggests that 
agents at the core of the network – not necessarily those with a higher number of 
connections, but connected to equally well connected users (Fig. 4C-D) – are the most 
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effective when it comes to spreading information, again in accordance with what has 
been found in research on epidemics and contagion 27. Spreaders, though, need to be 
recruited first, and the same decomposition analysis does not find any significant 
association between thresholds and topology, i.e. early participants do not have a 
characteristic network position; they are instead scattered all over the network (see SI, 
Fig. S5).   
 
Discussion 
The role that SNSs play in helping protests grow is uncontested by most media reports 
of recent events. However, there is not much evidence of how exactly these online 
platforms can help disseminate calls for action and organize a collective movement. Our 
findings suggest that there are two parallel processes taking place: the dynamics of 
recruitment, and the dynamics of information diffusion. While being central in the 
network is crucial to be influential in the diffusion process, there is no topological 
position that characterizes the early participants that trigger recruitment. This suggests 
that whatever exogenous factors motivate early participants to start sending messages, 
the consequence is that they create random seeding in the online network: they spur 
focuses of early activity that are topologically heterogeneous and that spread through 
low threshold individuals. This finding is consistent with previous work using simulations 
that test (and challenge) the influential hypothesis 16-17. However, a small core of central 
users is still critical to trigger chains of messages of high orders of magnitude. The 
advantage that this minority has as cascade generators – or as the ‘percolating cluster’ 
(16) – derives from their location at the core of the network; this suggests that, contrary 
to what has been argued in previous research (4), centrality in the network of followers 
is still a meaningful measure of influence in online networks – at least in the context of 
mass mobilizations. 
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The decision to join a protest depends on multiple reasons that we do not capture with 
online data – for instance, the amount of offline news media to which users are exposed. 
It is not surprising, then, that network position does not account for time of activation as 
it does for cascading influence (the diffusion of messages is, for the most part, 
endogenous and dependant on the network structure). However, there is one element in 
the recruitment process that is endogenous as well, and that is the timing of exposures. 
The existence of recruitment bursts indicates that the effects of complex contagion [16] 
are boosted by accelerated exposure, that is, by multiple stimuli received from different 
sources that take place within a small time window. These bursts – facilitated by the 
speed at which information flows online – provide empirical evidence of what scholars of 
social movements have called, metaphorically, “collective effervescence”. We provide a 
measure for that metaphor and find that most users are susceptible to it. These findings 
qualify threshold models of collective action that do not take into account the urgency to 
join that bursts of activity instill in people.  
 
In addition, this study provides evidence of why horizontal organizations (like the 
platform coordinating this protest, see SI) are so successful at mobilizing people through 
SNSs: their decentralized structure, based on coalitions of smaller organizations, plant 
activation seeds randomly at the start of the recruitment process, which maximizes the 
chances of reaching a percolating core; users at this core, in turn, contribute to the 
growth of the movement by generating cascades of messages that trigger new 
activations, and so forth. These joint dynamics illustrate the trade-off between global 
bridges (controlled by well connected users) and local networks: the former are efficient 
at transmitting information, the later at transmitting behaviors (21). This is one reason 
why Twitter is behind so many recent protests and mobilizations: it combines the global 
reach of broadcasters with local, personalized relations (which we capture in the form of 
reciprocal connections); in the light of our data, both are important to articulate the 
growth of a movement. Again, being able to generate recruitment patterns on a scale of 
this order is still an exceptional event, and this study sheds no light that helps predict 
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when it will happen again; but it shows that when exceptional events like mass 
mobilizations take place, recruitment and information diffusion dynamics are reinforcing 
each other along the way.  
 
Our data has two main limitations. First, we might be overestimating social influence 
because we do not control for demographic information and the effects of homophily in 
network formation 28. Studies that control for demographic attributes, however, still find 
that networks are significant predictors of recruitment 9,13; in the light of those findings, 
we can only assume that online networks will still be significant channels for the spread 
of behavior once demographics are taken into account. Second, we also do not control 
for exposure to offline media, which is likely to have interacted with social influence. 
However, the lack of media coverage before the demonstrations of May 15 allows us to 
conduct a natural experiment and compare how the network channels recruitment with 
and without the common knowledge of media exposure. We show that there is no 
significant shift to the left of the threshold distribution once the media starts reporting 
on the protests; this would have indicated that exposure to mass media led to a higher 
proportion of users joining the protests in the absence of local pressure. On the contrary, 
we find that local pressure is still an important precursor for a large number of users, 
and that the vast majority are still susceptible to bursts of activity in their local 
networks.  
 
Future research should address if the dynamics we identify with Twitter data are 
platform-dependent or universal to different types of online networks. Recent events, 
like the riots in London in August 2011, suggest that different online platforms are being 
used to mobilize different populations. The question that future research should consider 
is if the same recruitment patterns apply regardless of the technology being used, or if 
the affordances of the technology (i.e. public/private by default) shape the collective 
dynamics that they help coordinate. The replication of these analyses with data covering 
similar events (like the OccupyWallStreet protests initiated in New York, and now 
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spreading to other U.S. cities) will also help determine if the dynamics we identify here 
can be generalized to different social contexts. 
 
Methods 
The data contains time-stamped tweets for the period April 25 to May 25. Messages 
related to the protests were identified using a list of 70 #hashtags (full list in SI). The 
collection of messages is restricted to Spanish language and to users connected from 
Spain, and it was archived by a local start-up company, Cierzo Development Ltd using 
the SMMART Platform. We estimate that our sample captures above a third of the total 
number of messages exchanged in Twitter related to the protests. The network of 
followers was reconstructed applying a one-step snowball sampling procedure, using the 
authors that sent protest messages as the seed nodes. An arc (i,j) in this network means 
that user i is following the Tweets of user j, and we assume that this network is static for 
the period we consider. The symmetric network filters out all asymmetric arcs, that is, 
for every arc (i,j) there also needs to be an arc (j,i).  
We reconstruct message chains assuming that protest activity is contagious if it takes 
place in short time windows. We do not have access to re-tweet (RT) information, but 
since all our messages are related to the 15-M movement, chains refer to the same 
subject matter (although the precise content of the messages in the same chain might 
differ). This measurement maps the extent to which the stream of content related to the 
protests diffuses in given time windows.  
The k-shell decomposition assigns a shell index ks to each user by pruning the network 
down to users with more than k neighbours. The process starts removing all nodes with 
degree k = 1, which are classified (together with their links) in a shell with index ks = 1. 
Nodes in the next shell, with degree k = 2, are then removed and assigned to ks = 2, 
and so forth until all nodes are removed (and all users are classified). Shells are layers of 
centrality in the network: users classified in shells with higher indexes are located at the 
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core, whereas users with lower indexes define the periphery of the network (see SI for 
details of node classification in shells). 
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Figure legends 
Fig 1. Fraction of recruited users over time. The vertical axis is normalized by the total 
number of users (87,569), the horizontal axis tracks the number of activated users 
accumulated by hours. At the end of our time window the proportion of activated users is 
98.03%, which means that the vast majority of users sent at least one protest message 
during this month. Vertical labels flag some of the events that took place during the 
period.  
 
Fig 2. Distribution of thresholds ka / kin. (A) The vertical axis measures the proportion of 
users activated for each threshold of activated neighbors, tracked in the horizontal axis. 
The figure shows measures for both the asymmetrical and symmetrical networks. When 
broadcasters (i.e. central users who do not reciprocate connections) are eliminated, the 
number of early participants with ka / kin = 0 increases by an order of magnitude, which 
suggests that broadcasters are influential at recruiting low-threshold individuals. Panel 
(B) splits the data in two subsets: the first subset considers recruitment activity before 
15-M, the day of the first mass demonstrations; the second subset tracks activity after 
15-M. Media coverage, which increased after 15-M, does not seem to cause a significant 
rise in the number of early activated, low-threshold users.  
 
Fig 3. Thresholds, recruitment bursts, and time of activation. (A) The figure measures 
the association between bursts of activity and thresholds; while early participants (ka / 
kin < 0.2) are not affected by bursts, moderate-threshold users (0.2 ≤ ka / kin ≤ 0.5) and 
high threshold users (ka / kin > 0.5) are more likely to join the exchange of messages if 
they see a sudden increase of participants in their local networks; the slope of the curve 
indicates that higher threshold users are more susceptible to bursts of activity. (B) This 
figure shows the percentage of activated users grouped as early, mid and late 
participants for each day of the period considered; most late participants joined the 
protests after 15-M, once a critical mass of mid participants had already been activated.  
 
16 
 
Fig 4. Distribution of cascade sizes and core position of spreaders. (A) The distribution of 
cascade sizes (Nc) suggests that only a few cascades percolate to affect most users, and 
that the vast majority die in the early stages of diffusion. (B) There is a positive 
correlation between the k-core of users starting the cascades, and the size of those 
cascades, suggesting that core users are more likely to be the seeds of global chains of 
information diffusion. (C) The nodes in the network arranged according to their k-core: 
higher k-cores indicate that nodes are more central, node size accounts for degree 
centrality, and node color indicates the maximum size of the cascades generated by the 
user (users generating the largest cascades are depicted in orange). (D) Example of a 
global cascade affecting about 35,000 nodes. Nodes in blue are users who participated in 
the diffusion of protest messages; nodes in orange were exposed to the messages but 
did not send messages of their own. The darker the shade of blue, the earlier users 
joined the cascade as spreaders; the lighter the shade of yellow, the later users joined 
the cascade as listeners.  
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
Protests Background 
The 15-M movement is a civic initiative with no party or union affiliation that emerged as 
a reaction to perceived political alienation and to demand better channels for democratic 
representation. The first mass demonstration, held on Sunday May 15, was conceived as 
a protest against bipartidism and the management of the economy in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. It was organized by the digitally coordinated platform “Real 
Democracy Now” (“Democracia Real Ya”), born online about three months before the 
first day of demonstrations. Hundreds of entities joined the platform, from small local 
associations to territorial delegations of larger groups like ATTAC (an international anti-
globalization organization) or Ecologists in Action (Ecologistas en Acción). Signatories of 
the original call included student associations, bloggers, defenders of human rights and 
people from the arts, but also hundreds of individual citizens of different age and 
ideologies. Under the motto “take the streets” (“toma la calle”), the movement 
organized peaceful protests that brought tens of thousands of people to the streets of 
more than fifty cities all over the country, with Madrid, Barcelona, Málaga, Alicante and 
Valencia leading in numbers. The slogans of the demonstrations included “we are not 
goods in the hands of politicians and bankers”, “we don’t pay this crisis” and “no more 
corruption, let’s pass to action”. The organizers cited as inspiring examples the Greek 
protests of 2008 and the revolutions in the Arab world earlier in 2011. 
After the 15-M demonstrations, hundreds of participants decided to continue the protests 
camping in the main squares of several cities (Puerta del Sol in Madrid, Plaça de 
Catalunya in Barcelona) until May 22, the following Sunday and the date for regional and 
local elections. During that week, protesters created committees to coordinate the 
logistics of the camp sites (from cleaning, to cooking, getting blankets or assembling 
covers to protect campers from the rain) and organized around open popular assemblies. 
The media, which had not covered the movement until the day of the first big 
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demonstrations, started covering the protests on a daily basis, particularly after the 
authorities tried to evict protesters from the squares by force, and the Electoral 
Committee declared the protests illegal. Despite the prohibition, the camps remained in 
place, receiving increasing popular support and staging daily demonstrations (see Fig. S1 
for timeline). Some of the most popular hashtags during this week included 
#spanishrevolution, #democraciarealya (“real democracy now”), #nonosvamos (“we 
don’t go”), #15M, and #notenemosmiedo (“we are not afraid”). Although the movement 
did not support any political party or explicitly advocated for strategic voting, the implicit 
demand was to support smaller parties to the detriment of the two majority parties, the 
incumbent social-democratic Socialist Party (PSOE) and the opposition centre-right 
Popular Party (PP). The elections of May 22, however, gave an overwhelming victory to 
the PP across the country. On that day, protesters in Madrid and Barcelona decided to 
stay in the squares. After a few altercations with the police (and increasing opposition 
from local commerce), protesters eventually vacated the squares in early June, four 
weeks after the protests started. The movement is still active, with the next big 
demonstration planned for October 15 2011 under the motto “United for Global Change” 
(see www.democraciarealya.es).  
Data Collection 
A list of 70 hashtags was used to identify Twitter messages related to the 15-M protests 
(see Table S1). The top seven hashtags appear in 71% of the messages analyzed. 
Because the collection of messages is restricted to Spanish language, activity expressed 
in any of the other official languages of Spain (Catalan, Basque, and Galician) is 
excluded from the sample, as are messages contributed by users not based in Spain. 
Many messages used more than one hashtag at a time.  
The matrix of followings and followers was collected at the end of the period studied. To 
collect it, we queried the Twitter API to retrieve the list of followings and followers for 
every unique user in our sample. We used a custom purpose Python 2.7 program and a 
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MySQL database, used as the central point of data collection. An example of the data 
mining program is available at https://github.com/Ibercivis/TwitterDataMining/.
Currently, the Twitter API has a limit of about 60-120 queries per IP address and hour. 
We spread the Python data mining program over a cloud of 128 different IPs using 
Eucaliptus as cloud controller and an address range from the university campus.  
Table S2 contains some descriptive statistics for the full and symmetrical networks 
reconstructed using the procedure above. Figure S3 plots the degree distribution for both 
networks; the difference is expected given that the symmetrical network eliminates very 
popular users who do not tend to reciprocate the connections established by their 
followers.
Activation Times and Network Structure 
Figure S2 shows that same-threshold actors vary significantly in their chronological 
activation day. This variance results from differences in local networks (which expose 
actors to different information contexts) but also from factors that we do not measure in 
our data, like frequency of use of Twitter. Variance is particularly high for low and high 
threshold actors, suggesting that exogenous factors are more likely to affect them. 
Overall, however, low threshold actors are more likely to be early participants than high 
threshold actors.  
Table S3 shows the number of users allocated to each k-shell for both networks in 
descending order. High k-values define the core of the network, small values define the 
periphery. An interesting feature of this distribution is the high number of users 
classified in the highest k-core, compared to the cores preceding it; this indicates that 
the network has a relatively well-sized core of well-connected users. Figure S4 provides 
a graphical representation of the k-shell decomposition. Nodes are arranged and colored 
in line with their core position: the further from the centre nodes are, the lower their k-
5
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core (and the lighter their color); nodes within the same core are arranged according to 
their degree (captured by node size). The figure shows that the most central users 
according to the number of connections they have is not always related to their core 
centrality.  
While the vast majority of users are classified in lower k-shells, the minority of users 
that occupy the core of the network are more likely to initiate large cascades; as Figure 
S5 shows, however, there is no significant association between topological position and 
being a seed in the recruitment process: users that lead the recruitment process are 
scattered all over the network.   
6

Figure S1. Observation window and timeline of protests related to the 15-M movement 
Figure S2. Activation day and threshold distribution 
Figure S3. Degree distribution of full and symmetric networks 
Figure S4. k-shell classification of nodes in the full network 
Figure S5. Lack of association between k-core and recruitment seeds 
Table S1. Complete list of hashtags used to retrieve 15-M messages from Twitter 
Table S2. Statistics for the network aggregated for the full period 
Table S3. Size of k-shells for asymmetrical and symmetrical networks 
25-A Start of observation window
5-M First demonstration attempts.
9-M Students occupy university.
15-M First mass demonstrations.
16-M Camps in squares of Madrid and Barcelona.
17-M Police evictions. Protesters mobilise (and camp) in several cities.
18-M Protests declared illegal.Thousands concentrate in squares.
19-M Popular support and media coverage increase. 
20-M Thousands camped. 
21-M Tens of thousands protest, defying ban. 
22-M Election day. Protesters decide to stay camped in squares. 
25-M End of observation window
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Table S1. Complete list of hashtags used to retrieve Twitter messages related to the 15-M 
protest.
hashtag translation number of messages
1 #acampadasol camping Sol 189251
2 #spanishrevolution Spanish revolution 158487
3 #nolesvotes don't vote for them 66329
4 #15m 15-M 65962
5 #nonosvamos we don't go 55245
6 #democraciarealya real democracy now 47463
7 #notenemosmiedo we are not afraid 32586
8 #yeswecamp yes we camp 31811
9 #15mani 15 demo 17986
10 #acampadasevilla camping Seville 14356
11 #globalcamp global camp 13186
12 #acampadavalencia camping Valencia 13129
13 #acampadagranada camping Granada 9717
14 #acampadamalaga camping Malaga 6808
15 #acampadazgz camping Zaragoza 6033
16 #consensodeminimos minimal consensus  4348
17 #italianrevolution Italian revolution 3981
18 #estonosepara this doesn't separate 3860
19 #acampadaalicante camping Alicante 3593
20 #tomalacalle take the streets 3517
21 #europeanrevolution European revolution 3035
22 #acampadapamplona camping Pamplona 2839
23 #worldrevolution Wold revolution 2777
24 #acampadapalma camping Palma 2709
25 #tomalaplaza take the square 2684
26 #acampadas camps 2339
27 #15mpasalo 15-M send it 2336
28 #cabemostodas we all fit in 1895
29 #nonosmovemos we don't move 1382
30 #3puntosbasicos 3 basic points 1378
31 #frenchrevolution French revolution 1164
32 #estonoseacaba this doesn't end 1120
33 #acampadatoledo camping Toledo 750
34 #nonosrepresentan they don't represent us 696
35 #acampadalondres camping London 627
36 #globalrevolution global revolution 622
37 #acampadazaragoza camping Zaragoza 462
38 #acampadaparis camping Paris 438
39 #takethesquare take the square 229

2
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Table S1. Complete list of hashtags (continued)
hashtag translation number of messages
40 #periodismoeticoya ethical journalism now 207
41 #hastalasgenerales until the general elections 45
42 #irishrevolution Irish revolution 39
43 #democraziarealeora real democracy now 38
44 #democraciaparticipativa participatory democracy now 33
45 #15mpamplona 15-M Pamplona 22
46 #barcelonarealya Barcelona real now 17
47 #dry_jaen real democracy now Jaen 12
48 #usarevolution USA revolution 12
49 #dry_caceres real democracy now Caceres 10
50 #dryasturies real democracy now Asturies 5
51 #democraziareale real democracy 4
52 #democratiereelle real democracy 3
53 #dry_cadiz real democracy now Cadiz 3
54 #dry_toledo real democracy now Toledo 3
55 #acampadasvlla camping Seville 2
56 #drybizkaia real democracy now Vizcaya 2
57 #dry_santander real democracy now Santander 2
58 #15mayovalencia 15-M Valencia 1
59 #dry_pisa real democracy now Pisa 1
60 #dryginebra real democracy now Geneva 0
61 #DRY_Algeciras real democracy now Algeciras 0
62 #demorealyaib real democracy now 0
63 #DRYGipuzkoa real democracy now Gipuzcua 0
64 #DryValladolid real democracy now Valladolid 0
65 #ItalRevolution Italian revolution 0
66 #BolognaDRY real democracy now Bologna 0
67 #DRY_Pavia real democracy now Pavia 0
68 #DRY_Almeria real democracy now Almeria 0
69 #15mayoCordoba 15-M Cordoba 0
70 #ciudades-dry real democracy now cities 0
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Table S2. Network statistics for the full and symmetrical network 
 Full Network Symmetrical Network 
N (# nodes) 87,569 80,715 
M (# arcs) 6,030,459 2,644,367 
<k> (avg degree) 69 33 
C (clustering) 0.220 0.198 
l (path length) 3.24 3.65 
D (diameter) 11 11 
r (assortativity) -0.139 -0.0344 
# strong components 5,249 139 
N giant component 82,253 80,421 
N 2nd component 4 4 
max(kin) (# following) 5,773 5,082 
max(kout) (# followers) 31,798 5,082 
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Table S3. Size of k-shells for asymmetrical and symmetrical networks 
asymmetrical 
network
symmetrical
network
ks N ks N
141 1308 115 471 
140 42 114 55 
139 95 113 88 
138 107 112 106 
137 47 111 14 
136 98 110 16 
135 61 109 24 
134 41 108 35 
133 87 107 33 
132 115 106 45 
131 81 105 52 
130 69 104 44 
129 136 103 15 
128 137 102 39 
127 138 101 37 
126 58 100 78 
125 123 99 48 
124 217 98 31 
123 158 97 91 
122 240 96 53 
121 114 95 61 
120 74 94 35 
119 88 93 174 
118 77 92 97 
117 79 91 50 
116 98 90 46 
115 127 89 43 
114 121 88 65 
113 127 87 16 
112 104 86 96 
111 71 85 55 
110 125 84 66 
109 179 83 73 
108 153 82 48 
107 117 81 48 
106 115 80 68 
105 103 79 55 
104 274 78 68 
103 167 77 58 

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Table S3. Size of k-shells for asymmetrical and symmetrical networks (continued) 
asymmetrical 
network
symmetrical
network
ks N ks N
102 150 76 106 
101 193 75 80 
100 164 74 54 
99 211 73 81 
98 142 72 88 
97 234 71 182 
96 186 70 103 
95 179 69 98 
94 180 68 86 
93 163 67 94 
92 249 66 143 
91 166 65 104 
90 214 64 117 
89 214 63 107 
88 231 62 139 
87 173 61 119 
86 272 60 189 
85 231 59 140 
84 260 58 216 
83 256 57 153 
82 211 56 152 
81 187 55 164 
80 220 54 160 
79 244 53 180 
78 266 52 263 
77 242 51 161 
76 292 50 222 
75 284 49 264 
74 304 48 221 
73 331 47 230 
72 302 46 210 
71 325 45 235 
70 276 44 320 
69 337 43 341 
68 314 42 297 
67 379 41 355 
66 316 40 321 
65 307 39 391 
64 380 38 372 
63 352 37 371 

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Table S3. Size of k-shells for asymmetrical and symmetrical networks (continued) 

asymmetrical 
network
symmetrical
network
ks N ks N
62 403 36 414 
61 398 35 433 
60 400 34 457 
59 368 33 426 
58 422 32 485 
57 414 31 461 
56 381 30 526 
55 436 29 609 
54 430 28 524 
53 500 27 659 
52 506 26 748 
51 497 25 831 
50 512 24 738 
49 600 23 850 
48 535 22 850 
47 597 21 916 
46 628 20 956 
45 573 19 1056 
44 627 18 1044 
43 597 17 1267 
42 593 16 1318 
41 653 15 1471 
40 693 14 1628 
39 720 13 1717 
38 718 12 1969 
37 822 11 2300 
36 742 10 2578 
35 801 9 2801 
34 799 8 3193 
33 853 7 3864 
32 898 6 4533 
31 855 5 4779 
30 900 4 5758 
29 1033 3 6094 
28 945 2 6164 
27 1067 1 6072 
26 1175   
25 1184   
24 1244   

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Table S3. Size of k-shells for asymmetrical and symmetrical networks (continued) 

asymmetrical 
network
symmetrical
network
ks N ks N
23 1279   
22 1330   
21 1371   
20 1474   
19 1560   
18 1703   
17 1665   
16 1755   
15 1875   
14 1878   
13 2040   
12 1997   
11 2190   
10 2246   
9 2237   
8 2240   
7 2317   
6 2319   
5 2242   
4 2176   
3 2046   
2 1713   
1 1355   
